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THE USE OF AMERICAN PRECEDENTS
IN CANADIAN COURTS
Gerard V. La Forest*
In 1849, the Supreme Court of New Brunswick faced the issue of
whether there was a public right to float logs on navigable streams.'
Not surprisingly, no general right was found in the English common
law as large scale floating of lumber down rivers did not exist in
England. "Yet in a young country like Canada, the right to float logs
and timber was an economic necessity in many areas and some de-
vice had to be found to make the activity legal.' '2 To find that legal
device, the New Brunswick court turned to the United States, spe-
cifically to Maine, and adopted the principle of floatability from
Wadsworth v. Smith.3 At a time when there was both necessity and
shared circumstances, Canadian courts referred to Maine's experi-
ence for guidance.
One hundred and thirty five years later, in 1984, the New Bruns-
wick Court of Queen's Bench faced the question of who had owner-
ship of land that was restored after a dam on a river was removed.4
Again, experience in Maine was helpful. Bradley v. Rice0 indicated
that the ownership rule applicable to normal rivers and streams also
applied to artificial ponds created by expanding a stream by means
of a dam, and the rule was applied in New Brunswick.
One would think such examples of regional borrowing would have
occurred frequently. This is particularly so because most of English
Canada began with the influx of the Loyalists who were on the los-
ing side of the American Revolution. United States statutes were
freely adopted in the new colonies, and many of the early lawyers
and judges had American training.6 Nonetheless, this sort of regional
interchange seemed to fall to the forces, however artificial in the
largest sense, that direct our legal attention along national rather
than regional lines. Thus, for further evidence of transborder inter-
* Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. This paper is adapted from a speech
given at the annual meeting of the Maine State Bar Association, held at St. Andrew,
New Brunswick, July 17, 1993.
1. Rowe v. Titus, 6 N.B.R. 326, 332-33 (1849).
2. G.V. LA FoREsT AND ASSAociTEs, WATER LAW iN CANADA-THE A rANrnc PRov-
INCES 191 (1993).
3. 11 Me. 278 (1834).
4. See Brophy v. Alexander Constr. Co., Ltd. and Village of Blackville, [1984] 55
N.B.R. 233, 238-39.
5. 13 Me. 198 (1836).
6. For example, New Brunswick's first Chief Justice, George Ludlow, had been a
judge in New York. See A.G. Warwick Gilbert, New Brunswick's First Chief Justice,
11 U.NB. UJ. 29 (1958). See also Patricia A. Ryder, Ward Chipman Sr- An Early
New Brunswick Judge, 12 U.N.B. LJ. 65 (1959).
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action, we must turn to the national stage, the subject of this paper.
TRADITIONAL USE OF FOREIGN AND AMERICAN MATERIAL
A. The Traditional Use of Foreign Material
Canadian courts have never been averse to the use of foreign
materials. The expansive use of foreign precedents by Canadian
courts has deep roots in Canada's formal and informal connections
to the traditions of Britain and of France, and the two great Euro-
pean private law traditions of common law and civil law. The civil
law tradition, however, was largely confined to Quebec. Legislatively,
even after the end of colonial status, many statutes were based on
English counterparts, so recourse to English precedents for interpre-
tation was understandable. What ensured the continued influence of
British material was the continued direct links to the English sys-
tem even after the union of the British North American colonies at
Confederation in 1867. Established in 1875, the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in Britain, rather than the Supreme Court of
Canada, remained the final court of appeal for Canada until 1949.
Well before the end of the formal link to the Judicial Committee,
courts had begun to place greater reliance on the now more exten-
sively developed Canadian sources. But the historical link to English
traditions had generated a continued willingness to use English
precedents. It was, in part, a function of familiarity, aided and abet-
ted by the relatively undeveloped state of Canadian law schools,
which, like the practitioners, relied heavily on English precedents
and textbooks. These influences were also strengthened by the fact
that a significant number of the leading lawyers were trained
abroad. In light of this environment, it is not surprising that foreign
material worked its way into the courts in Canada. It was a function
of necessity flowing from the fact that Canada was then a small soci-
ety with a relatively short legal tradition.
This background affords only a partial explanation for our mod-
ern and expanding reliance on foreign materials. I like to think this
recent phenomenon is a reflection of a Canadian perspective. Can-
ada is now a larger, more influential society, with its own fairly
lengthy legal tradition. Necessity has been replaced by a sincere out-
ward-looking interest in the views of other societies, especially those
with traditions similar to ours. Our increasing resort to American
materials is only a part of this more cosmopolitan approach to law.
B. The Use of American Materials
The fact that American materials were occasionally used from the
beginning of Canada's jurisprudence is a product of a number of
forces. Both countries share a common law heritage in private law
and in liberal democratic and federal structures of government. Sec-
ond, there were commercial and other forces peculiar to the North
[Vol. 46:211
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American legal and societal development. Third, and increasingly
since World War II, many of our legal scholars took their training at
the great law schools in the United States, and legal education in
Canada has since largely adopted the American model. There is a
definite link between the use of these foreign materials and the for-
eign training of the judge or lawyer. In an article surveying the use
of American jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Canada, it was
found that the six judges with American educational training were
leaders in the use and citation of American precedents7 For exam-
ple, the great Supreme Court Justice, Ivan C. Rand, who earned his
LL.B. from Harvard, was the leading user of American materials in
the Court of the 1950s.8 My own willingness to use American materi-
als was certainly enhanced by my time spent as a graduate fellow at
Yale. Nonetheless, it remained true that until recent years the use of
American materials was infrequent, sometimes shallow, and defi-
nitely overshadowed by the use of English and, in Quebec, French
precedents.
Still the use of American material gradually expanded. The
United States was often the only or first jurisdiction to deal with
many new areas of law. A particularly Canadian institution, the Law
Reform Commissions, in carrying out their mandates became quite
familiar with American reform initiatives ranging from evidence
codes and the uniform commercial codes to the Model Criminal
Code and codes of procedure and often improved on these as they
went along. All these developments set the stage, making the Cana-
dian courts ripe for the expanded use of American materials. But it
really was one event, the enactment in April 1982 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter),' our version of a consti-
tutional Bill of Rights, that marked the decisive point in this transi-
tion to an expanded use of American materials.
THE INFLUENCE ON CHARTER INTERPRETATION
In public law especially, the Canadian experience was already very
distinct from the English experience. The Charter made it even
more so. The leading repository of civil rights jurisprudence was
clearly the American experience with the Bill of Rights. In its very
first Charter case, our Supreme Court noted that American experi-
ence in constitutional interpretation was of more than passing inter-
est.10 Counsel were not slow to respond. They raised a vast panoply
of issues, citing in support of their positions a plethora of American
precedents as we passed through an experience that I described five
7. S.I. Bushnell, The Use of American Cases, 35 U.N.B. L.J. 157, 169 (1986).
8. Id.
9. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
10. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 367.
1994]
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years ago:
It is a rather strange sensation to sit on the Court at this time. It
is like compressing the United States' experience of about 50 years
into a moment of time. There was no building up gradually as oc-
curred in the United States, beginning with a relatively blank slate.
There is the good news that we can turn to American experience,
but the bad news is that we have to learn it as we go along. It is
voluminous and it has to be sieved through different verbal formu-
lations and community experience. In other words, we have to
learn it from scratch, and then try to apply it intelligently to our
somewhat different situation. 1
In some areas, American precedents proved to be of immediate
and direct assistance. For example, in assessing the constitutionality
of indeterminate sentences for dangerous offenders, I was very much
influenced by the American material.12 It was immediately apparent,
however, that American principles would always have to be adjusted
to suit the different Canadian context and that transposition re-
quired great caution.13 Speaking of the equivalent of the American
right to speedy trial, for example, I made it clear in R. v. Rahey,1
4
that American jurisprudence, while helpful, could not be slavishly
followed. In somewhat strident terms, I stated:
While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer
to American constitutional jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate
the meaning of Charter guarantees that have counterparts in the
United States Constitution, they should be wary of drawing too
ready a parallel between constitutions born to different countries
in different ages and in very different circumstances, particularly
given the substantive implications of both s. 1 and s. 24(1) of the
Charter. Canadian legal thought has at many points in the past
deferred to that of the British; the Charter will be no sign of our
national maturity if it simply becomes an excuse for adopting an-
other intellectual mentor. American jurisprudence, like the British,
must be viewed as a tool, not as a master.1"
The majority did not heed my warning in that particular case, but
did not disagree with the sentiment.
In particular, many commentators have observed that the Charter
reflected our greater communitarian, less individualistic traditions.10
11. G6rard V. La Forest, The Use of International and Foreign Material in the
Supreme Court of Canada, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1988 CONFERENCE OF THE CANADIAN
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 230, 238 (1988).
12. R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, 315-16.
13. Hunter v. Southam, Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 161.
14. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588.
15. Id. at 639.
16. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, "Liberalism, Individualism, and Minority Rights" in
A.C. Hutchinson and L.J.M. Green, eds., Law and the Community: The End of Indi-
vidualism? 181 (1990); J.E. Magnet, "Multiculturalism and Collective Rights: Ap-
[Vol. 46:211
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Indeed, this aspect of Canadian society could be seen in the very
drafting of the Charter. In particular, it included sections specifi-
cally affirming multiculturalism, the rights of women, linguistic mi-
norities, and aboriginal peoples. There was also the broader scope of
our equality rights under Section 15. And finally, and perhaps most
importantly, is the express balancing device of the general justifica-
tion provision in Section 1, which guarantees the Charter rights,
"subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.' 7
Differences between Canadian and American legal traditions have
been readily apparent, for example, in the area of freedom of expres-
sion. Of course, there are many similarities because both our socie-
ties place a high premium on that right. Thus, we have followed
American precedents in defining the purposes of our right to free-
dom of expression protected by Section 2(b) of our Charter. In fact,
we have gone beyond the American cases in defining the scope of
protected speech. In particular, our courts have emphasized that
Section 2(b) is content neutral. The only restriction so far in Section
2(b) has been for violent speech or threats of violence."
In applying Section 1 of the Charter, Canadian courts have per-
mitted scope for government restrictions on free speech for the pro-
tection of various vulnerable groups and individuals in society. The
American "strict scrutiny" standard has not been followed. In the
central case, R. v. Keegstra,9 the majority departed from American
First Amendment jurisprudence on the basis of differing national
traditions, and upheld the hate propaganda laws in the Criminal
Code. The accused there had been charged with wilful promotion of
hatred. He had been teaching children in a rural Alberta school that
the Holocaust never occurred and that there existed a worldwide
Jewish conspiracy. In support of its position, our Court relied heav-
ly on international conventions, a recurring theme with Canadian
court, that took the same view of the matter. In R. v. Butler,2 0 the
Court unanimously upheld obscenity laws aimed, as the Court inter-
preted them, at depictions of sexual violence against women, or sex-
ual acts with children, on the basis of evidence that such depictions
are harmful to women and children. The Court substituted a
"harm" approach for a "community standard" approach.2'
The Canadian courts have developed considerable sophistication
proaches to Section 27" in G.A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny, eds. The Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms, 739 (2nd ed. 1989); Michael Hartney, "Some Confusions
Concerning Collective Rights" IV:2 Can. J. of Law and Jurisprudence 293 (1991).
17. PER W. HOGO, Constitutional Law of Canada 678-79 (1985).
18. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
19. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
20. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.
21. Id. at 476-81.
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in their understanding of American law. At times they follow one
strand of American thinking, rather than the one adopted by Ameri-
can courts. One example is R. v. Duarte,22 a case dealing with the
state's use of warrantless electronic surveillance techniques when a
participant has given his or her consent to such use. In my judgment
for the Duarte Court, I refused to follow the more conservative
views of the United States Supreme Court.23 1 preferred the position
taken by Justice Harlan, in dissent, who feared the spillover effects
of such unregulated surveillance, which "subjects each and every
law-abiding member of society to that risk."'2' I also relied on the
more liberal view of a number of state appellate courts in interpret-
ing their state constitutions, noting that their "decisions make an
eloquent case in support of the proposition that unregulated partici-
pant surveillance cannot be reconciled with the right to be secure
against unreasonable search and seizure.
'25
The repeated use of American constitutional material, though un-
doubtedly the most extensive and rewarding, is simply an aspect of
a more general trend. In dealing with cases involving human rights,
we make frequent references to international instruments and their
application both by international bodies and domestic courts in va-
rious countries.28 This is, in part, a reflection not only of the fact
that the Charter and other human rights instruments were adopted
against the background of the post-war international recognition of
human rights throughout the globe but is also grounded in a belief
in the value of comparative analysis. Thus, we frequently cite Euro-
pean sources with regard to both human rights and economic
integration. 7
EXPANDED USE IN OTHER AREAS
The use of American and foreign material has spread into other
areas of Canadian law, whether public, commercial, or private. In a
number of fields this trend preceded the Charter, but the growing
familiarity with American sources has spurred this development.
One area is labor law. In the recent case of Dayco (Canada) Ltd. v.
CAW-Canada,28 for example, the Court was called upon to discuss
the survivability of retiree benefits under a collective agreement. De-
spite the different remedial structures in the two countries, we ac-
cepted the American conclusion that such rights can be vested in
22. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30.
23. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
24. Id. at 789; see R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 54.
25. R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 49.
26. See La Forest, supra note 11.
27. See, e.g., Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591; Morguard In-
vestments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
28. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 230.
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the individual retirees. Reliance on American law is most valuable,
as in this instance, where American courts have wrestled with a
problem before we have. This has frequently happened in the field
of insurance where a significant part of the industry is organized on
North American lines.29 We have in recent years been consulting
American and foreign experience in areas of law as diverse as sterili-
zation, 0 executive immunity," sovereign immunity, 2 extradition,"
conflicts of laws,34 and lately, more ambitiously, tort and contract,"-
fiduciary relationships, 3 and constructive trusts.3 7 This effort is a
significant attempt to rationalize and integrate the law of civil liabil-
ity and its various remedies. In several cases, our Court reviewed the
relevant law not only of the United States, Great Britain, and the
Commonwealth countries, but also the civil law experience in Que-
bec, France, and Germany.
Recent practice indicates that American and foreign materials are
being used in different areas in a more sophisticated way than ever
before in Canada. It may be that recourse to American materials will
become less necessary in the Charter context as we develop a more
extensive and distinctive domestic jurisprudence in the area, but I
am confident that the use of American, international, and foreign
materials will continue to grow in other areas.
More and more American law is being cited by counsel. No doubt
this is partly due to the fact that an increasing number of our young
lawyers receive training in the United States and abroad. Transna-
tional influences such as growing international trade, international
crime, and international firms play a part in the increasing use of
such sources. So too do international information systems that allow
quick searches of storehouses of legal material. More importantly,
the Court's use of these materials feeds their further use.
Why do Canadians use foreign materials? What benefit do we
seek? Certainly it is no longer merely a habit of dependence. Rather,
as I said, it is because we are genuinely interested in the compara-
tive approach, in learning how other traditions have dealt with the
problems with which we are wrestling. This sort of legal cosmopoli-
tanism is a valuable source of enrichment and greater sophistication.
29. N.B. (Greece) v. Katsikonouris, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1029; Kosmopoulo3 v. Consti-
tution Ins. Co., [1987] 1 S.C.&. 2.
30. E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388.
31. Carey v. Ontario, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 637.
32. Re Canada Labour Code, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 50.
33. Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536.
34. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
35. Canadian Nat'I Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co., [19921 1 S.C.R. 1021.
36. Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226; McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992 2
S.C.R& 138.
37. London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel Int'l Ltd., [19921 3 S.C.R. 299; Lac
Minerals Ltd. v. Int'l Corona Resources, Ltd., [19891 2 S.C.R. 574.
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It must, however, be subjected to critical evaluation in terms of its
relevance to the Canadian situation.
LESSONS FOR AMERIcAs
What does the Canadian experience with American precedents in-
dicate with respect to the possibility for American lawyers looking
north? One recent article on the criminal law jurisprudence under
our Charter concluded on the pessimistic note that, although Cana-
dian courts were referring to United States precedents with increas-
ing sophistication, American jurists have yet to show a similar inter-
est in Canadian criminal jurisprudence.38 Similarly, at a seminar
with American judges on international human rights last year, I was
amazed to find that American courts rarely make reference to inter-
national agreements on the subject, whereas one scholar has counted
nearly 150 Canadian cases that made reference to international doc-
uments on human rights law from the enactment of the Charter in
1982 to 1990.'9
I suppose this is normal enough for a great power; especially one
with such a wealth and variety of material at home. Even apart from
this, habit may prevent American lawyers and judges from seeing
the opportunities that lie in comparative analysis. Yet perhaps the
lesson we have learned can work both ways. I would hope so. Some-
times American courts may need to remind themselves that this
may be a concomitant of, and a source of enrichment, in an interde-
pendent world. In areas where there is little American jurispru-
dence, turning to some comparative concepts may not simply be an
exercise in esoteric theory. As in trade, it is surprising where little
pockets of particular expertise develop in foreign courts. Canada
may not be a bad place to look because our traditions, while differ-
ent enough to encourage different perspectives, share enough com-
mon concepts to ensure possible applicability.
Through happenstance, other jurisdictions may first have to face
novel issues or particular viewpoints. To take a very high profile ex-
ample, our Court is currently struggling with the constitutionality of
a statute that criminalizes physician-assisted suicide,'40 which is
something I believe American courts will soon face. The parties to
the case presented material from many jurisdictions including the
United States, which we read with the greatest interest. As we seem
to be one of the first national courts to face this question dead on,
38. Robert Harvie and Hamnor Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums: The
Supreme Court of Canada, American Jurisprudence and the Continuing Revision of
Criminal Law Under the Charter, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 39, 112 (1992).
39. WILLIAM SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE CANADIAN
CHARTER, 12 and Appendix 11 (1991).
40. Since this paper was prepared, the Court has issued its decision; see Rodri-
guez v. R., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (finding the provision constitutional).
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and because of the similarity of the constitutional protections relied
on to challenge the statute criminalizing such assistance, I would
think our treatment of this area may be of interest to an American
court.
This may extend to other areas where Canadian courts have been
wrestling first, or more intensively, with policy concerns that de-
velop later or less squarely in the United States. In the area of civil
liability, for example, I have mentioned that we are attempting to
set up a principled assessment of recovery for various types of civil
wrongs, based on a realistic assessment informed by modem eco-
nomics and law analysis, and on a synthesis and comparison with
the practice in a number of civil law jurisdictions. Far less restrictive
than the approach recently followed in the United Kingdom, the Ca-
nadian approach could be examined as an alternative analysis of
these issues. An added benefit for American users of such cases is
that Canadian courts frequently make the connection of their deci-
sion to the American jurisprudence by citing the relevant American
cases. Such references and links would be easy to determine given
the existing electronic search services that have spread to include
Canadian sources.
In this particular field, our work has received very favourable
comments throughout the common law world, and even in Europe. I
shall take the liberty of citing one. It is a comment by Professor
John Fleming of the University of California (Berkeley) on a recent
case on tortious recovery for pure economic loss. He said:
This case is undoubtedly of first class importance and destined
to become the point of reference for other courts throughout the
common law world. True, it did not speak with one voice, but the
very juxtaposition of divergent views, so ably presented, amply
makes up this failing. It also serves as a model in two other, very
important, matters of style. One is the consulting of comparative
legal material, not as a polite gesture to the civil law tradition of
Quebec alone but in earnest search for lessons from the experience
of others. The parochialism pervading particularly the British judi-
cial scene stands rebuked by the cosmopolitan scholarship of the
Canadian profession.... The second milestone is the exacting
analysis in the terms of economic theory... That it has now
found an entry also in the Commonwealth gives hope for an era of
more tighter-reasoned articulation of legal policy in general. Alto-
gether an exciting experience.' 1
It may even happen that Canadian judgments can provide a con-
41. John Fleming, Economic Loss in Canada (1993), THE ToRT LAw Rmvw 68,
74. See also B.S. Markensenis, Compensation for Negligently Inflicted Pure Eco-
nomic Loss: Some Canadian Views (1993), 109 LAw QuAma. Rzv. 5; Sir Robin Cooke,
The Condition of the Law of Tort, Frontiers of Liability Seminar for The Society of
Public Teachers of Law, All Souls College, Oxford (July 3, 1993) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
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sidered attempt to deal with and synthesize conflicting American
material in a particular area. Thus, in the recent decision of Re Can-
ada Labour Code (USA v. PSAC),'42 our Court had to determine
whether the Canadian Labour Code applied to civilians working on
an American military base leased by Newfoundland on a World War
II lend-lease agreement. Because of the dearth of Canadian author-
ity, I attempted to work my way through some fairly complex
United States materials on sovereign immunity, and to rationalize
and synthesize the basic American law in that area.
Finally, Canadian jurisprudence may also be of interest in estab-
lished areas because of the acceptance of a different viewpoint. I re-
fer to the obscenity case noted earlier, which has elicited some inter-
est south of the border.4 3 Again, our Court has in recent years
reassessed the law of extradition both in terms of the Charter and
its own basic structure and rationale so as to meet the escalating
challenges posed by transnational crimes. 4' As well, I have already
mentioned our recent forays into civil liability.
To conclude, the use of foreign material affords another source,
another tool for the construction of better judgments. Recourse to
such materials is, of course, not needed in every case, but from time
to time a look outward may reveal refreshing perspectives. The
greater use of foreign materials by courts and counsel in all coun-
tries can, I think, only enhance their effectiveness and sophistica-
tion. In this era of increasing global interdependence, and in partic-
ular of even closer American-Canadian relations, it seems normal
that there should be increased sharing in and among our law and
lawyers as well.
42. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 50.
43. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Harm, Morality and Feminist Religion: Canada's
New-But Not So New-Approach to Obscenity, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 105 (1993).
The same author wrote an earlier commentary on our Court's abortion decision in R.
v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30: The Canadian Abortion Decision and Its Implica-
tions for American Constitutional Law and Theory, 26 CONST. COMMENTARY 299
(1989).
44. See, e.g., McVey v. United States, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475; United States v. Co-
troni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469; Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536.
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